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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the various types of physical
universe which could exist according to modern mathematical physics.
The paper begins with an introduction that approaches the question from
the viewpoint of ontic structural realism. Section 2 takes the case of the
‘multiverse’ of spatially homogeneous universes, and analyses the famous
Collins-Hawking argument, which purports to show that our own universe
is a very special member of this collection. Section 3 considers the mul-
tiverse of all solutions to the Einstein field equations, and continues the
discussion of whether the notions of special and typical can be defined
within such a collection.
1 Introduction
Einstein famously claimed that “what really interests me is whether God had
any choice in the creation of the world.” This is generally considered to be a
whimsical version of the question, ‘is there only one logically possible physical
universe?’ The modern answer to this question is: ‘apparently not!’
In this paper, we will approach the notion of possible physical universes
using the philosophical doctrine of structural realism, which asserts that, in
mathematical physics at least, the physical domain of a true theory is an instance
of a mathematical structure.1 It follows that if the domain of a true theory
extends to the entire physical universe, then the entire universe is an instance of
a mathematical structure. Equivalently, it is asserted that the physical universe
is isomorphic to a mathematical structure. Let us refer to this proposal as
‘universal structural realism’.
Whilst the definition of structural realism is most frequently expressed in
terms of the set-theoretical, Bourbaki notion of a species of mathematical struc-
ture, one can reformulate the definition in terms of other approaches to the
foundations of mathematics, such as mathematical category theory. In the latter
case, one would assert that our physical universe is an object in a mathematical
category.
1This notion was originally advocated by Patrick Suppes (1969), Joseph Sneed (1971),
Frederick Suppe (1989), and others.
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Many of the authors writing about such ideas neglect to assert that the
universe is an instance of a mathematical structure, but instead claim that the
universe is a mathematical structure. In some cases this can be taken as merely
an abbreviated form of speech; in others, the distinction in meaning is deliberate,
and such authors may be sympathetic to the notion that the physical universe is
nothing but form, and the notion of substance has no meaning. This corresponds
to Ladyman’s distinction (1998) between the ontic and epistemic versions of
structural realism. Whilst the epistemic version accepts that mathematical
physics captures the structure possessed by the physical world, it holds that
there is more to the physical world beyond the structure that is possesses. In
contrast, the ontic version holds that the structure of the physical world is the
only thing which exists.
Those expressions of universal structural realism which state that ‘the’ phys-
ical universe is an instance of a mathematical structure, tacitly assume that our
physical universe is the only physical universe. If one removes this assumption,
then universal structural realism can be taken as the two-fold claim that (i)
our physical universe is an instance of a mathematical structure, and (ii), other
physical universes, if they exist, are either different instances of the same math-
ematical structure, or instances of different mathematical structures. Given
that mathematical structures are arranged in tree-like hierarchies, other phys-
ical universes may be instances of mathematical structures which are sibling
to the structure possessed by our universe. In other words, the mathematical
structures possessed by other physical universes may all share a common par-
ent structure, from which they are derived by virtue of satisfying additional
conditions. This would enable us to infer the mathematical structure of other
physical universes by first generalizing from the mathematical structure of our
own, and then classifying all the possible specializations of the common, generic
structure.
It is common these days to refer to the hypothetical collection of all physical
universes as the multiverse. I will refrain from using the phrase ‘ensemble of all
universes’, because an ensemble is typically considered to be a space which pos-
sesses a probability measure, and it is debatable whether the universe collections
considered in this paper possess a natural probability measure. It should also
be emphasised that no physical process will be suggested to account for the ex-
istence of the multiverses considered in this paper. This paper will not address
those theories, such as Linde’s chaotic inflation theory (1983a and 1983b) or
Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection (1997), which propose physical
processes that yield collections of universes or universe-domains. The universes
considered in this paper are mutually disjoint, and are not assumed to be the
outcome of a common process, or the outcome of any process at all.
If a physical universe is conceived to be an instance of a mathematical struc-
ture, i.e. a structured set, then it is natural to suggest that the multiverse
is a collection of such instances, or a collection of mathematical structures.
Tegmark, for example, characterises this view as suggesting that “some sub-
set of all mathematical structures...is endowed with...physical existence,” (1998,
p1). As Tegmark points out, such a view of the multiverse fails to explain why
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some particular collection of mathematical structures is endowed with physical
existence rather than another. His response is to suggest that all mathematical
structures have physical existence.
Like many authors, Tegmark implicitly assumes that the physical universe
must be a structured set (or an instance thereof). As Rucker asserts, “if reality
is physics, if physics is mathematics, and if mathematics is set theory, then
everything is a set,” (Rucker 1982, p200). However, as already alluded to,
mathematics cannot be identified with set theory, hence it doesn’t follow that
everything is a set. There are mathematical objects, such as topoi, which are
not sets. Hence, it may be that the physical universe is not a set.
Category theory is able to embrace objects which are not sets. A category
consists of a collection of objects such that any pair of objects has a collection
of morphisms between them. The morphisms satisfy a binary operation called
composition, which is associative, and each object has a morphism onto itself
called the identity morphism. For example, the category Set contains all sets as
objects and the functions between sets as morphisms; the category of topological
spaces has continuous functions as morphisms; and the category of smooth
manifolds has smooth (infinitely-differentiable) maps as morphisms. One also
has categories such as the category Top of all topoi, in which the morphisms
need not be special types of functions and the objects need not be special types of
set. One can therefore generalize the central proposition of universal structural
realism, to assert that the physical universe is an object in a mathematical
category.
If the physical universe is not a structured set of some kind, then the mul-
tiverse may not be a collection of structured sets either. In fact, in the case of
Tegmark’s suggestion that the multiverse consists of all mathematical sets, it is
well-known that there is no such thing as the set of all sets, so Tegmark would be
forced into conceding that the multiverse is not a set itself, but the category of
all sets, perhaps. More generally, one could suggest that the multiverse is a col-
lection of mathematical objects, which may or may not be structured sets. The
multiverse may be a category, but it may not be a category of structured sets.
The analogue of Tegmark’s suggestion here would perhaps be to propose that all
categories physically exist. Categories can be related by maps called ‘functors’,
which map the objects in one category to the objects in another, and which map
the morphisms in one category to the morphisms in the other category, in a way
which preserves the composition of morphisms. Furthermore, one can relate
one functor to another by something called a ‘natural transformation’. In ef-
fect, one treats functors as higher-level objects, and natural transformations are
higher-level morphisms between these higher-level objects. Accordingly, natural
transformations are referred to as ‘2-morphisms’. Whilst a category just pos-
sesses objects and morphisms, a 2-category possesses objects, morphisms and
2-morphisms. The collection of all categories is a 2-category in the sense that
it contains categories, functors between categories, and natural transformations
between functors; each category is an object, the functors between categories
are morphisms, and the natural transformations are 2-morphisms. However, the
2-category of all categories is only one example of a 2-category. A 2-category
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which has categories as objects, need not contain all categories, and a 2-category
need not even have categories as objects. To fully develop Tegmark’s sugges-
tion, one would need to propose that all 2-categories physically exist, and the
latter itself is just one example of a 3-category. One would need to continue
indefinitely, with the category of all n-categories always just one example of an
n+ 1-category, for all n ∈ N.
Let us return, however, to the notion that a physical universe is an instance
of a structured set, and let us refine this notion in terms of mathematical logic.
A theory is a set of sentences, in some language, which is closed under logical
implication. A model for a set of sentences is an interpretation of the langauge
in which those sentences are expressed, which renders each sentence as true.
Each theory in mathematical physics has a class of models associated with it.
As Earman puts it, “a practitioner of mathematical physics is concerned with
a certain mathematical structure and an associated set M of models with this
structure. The...laws L of physics pick out a distinguished sub-class of models
ML := Mod(L) ⊂ M, the models satisfying the laws L (or in more colorful, if
misleading, language, the models that “obey” the laws L),” (p4, 2002). Hence,
any theory whose domain extends to the entire universe, (i.e. any cosmological
theory), has a multiverse associated with it: namely, the class of all models of
that theory. For a set Σ of sentences, let Mod Σ denote the class of all models
of Σ. The class Mod Σ, if non-empty, is too large to be a set, (Enderton 2001,
p92). Hence, in this sense, the multiverse associated with any cosmological
theory is too large to be a set itself. At face value, this seems to contradict the
fact that, whilst many of the multiverses considered in cosmology possess an
infinite cardinality, and may even form an infinite-dimensional space, they are,
nevertheless, sets. This apparent contradiction arises because physicists tacitly
restrict the range of interpretations of the languages in which their theories
are expressed, holding the meaning of the predicates fixed, but allowing the
variables to range over different domains.
A theory T is complete if for any sentence σ, either σ or ¬σ belongs to
T . If a sentence is true in some models of a theory but not in others, then
the theory is incomplete. Godel’s first incompleteness theorem demonstrates
that Peano arithmetic is incomplete. Hence, any theory which includes Peano
arithmetic will also be incomplete. If a final theory of everything includes Peano
arithmetic, (an apparently moderate requirement), then the final theory will be
incomplete. Such a final theory of everything would not eliminate contingency.
There would be sentences true in some models of a final theory, but not true in
others. Hence, the multiverse hypothesis looms over even a hypothetical final
theory of everything. Godel’s incompleteness theorem dispels the possibility
that there is only one logically possible physical universe.
Jesus Mosterin (2004) points out that “the set of all possible worlds is not
at all defined with independence from our conceptual schemes and models. If
we keep a certain model (with its underlying theories and mathematics) fixed,
the set of the combinations of admissible values for its free parameters gives
us the set of all possible worlds (relative to that model). It changes every
time we introduce a new cosmological model (and we are introducing them
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all the time). Of course, one could propose considering the set of all possible
worlds relative to all possible models formulated in all possible languages on the
basis of all possible mathematics and all possible underlying theories, but such
consideration would produce more dizziness than enlightment.”
Mosterin’s point here is aimed at the anthropic principle, and the suggestion
that there are multiverses which realize all possible combinations of values for
the free parameters in physical theories such as the standard model of particle
physics. At face value, these are different types of multiverse than the ones
proposed in this paper, which are obtained by varying mathematical structures,
and by taking all the models of a fixed mathematical structure, rather than
by taking all the values of the free parameters within a theory. However, the
values chosen for the free parameters of a theory correspond to a choice of
model in various parts of the theory. For example, the free parameters of the
standard model of particle physics include the coupling constants of the strong
and electromagnetic forces, two parameters which determine the Higgs field
potential, the Weinberg angle, the masses of the elementary quarks and leptons,
and the values of four parameters in the Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix which
specifies the ‘mixing’ of the {d, s, b} quark flavours in weak force interactions.
The value chosen for the coupling constant of a gauge field with gauge group G
corresponds to a choice of metric in the lie algebra g, (Derdzinksi 1992, p114-
115); the Weinberg angle corresponds to a choice of metric in the lie algebra
of the electroweak force, (ibid., p104-111); the values chosen for the masses of
the elementary quarks and leptons correspond to the choice of a finite family
of irreducible unitary representations of the local space-time symmetry group,
from a continuous infinity of alternatives on offer; and the choice of a specific
Kobayashi-Maskawa matrix corresponds to the selection of a specific orthogonal
decomposition σd′⊕σs′⊕σb′ of the fibre bundle which represents a generalization
of the {d, s, b} quark flavours, (ibid., p160).
In general relativity, a universe is represented by a 4-dimensional differential
manifold M equipped with a metric tensor field g and a set of matter fields
and gauge force fields {φi} which generate an energy-stress-momentum tensor
T that satisfies the Einstein field equations
T = 1/(8piG)(Ric− 1/2 S g) .
Ric denotes the Ricci tensor field determined by g, and S denotes the curvature
scalar field. The matter fields have distinctive equations of state, and include
fluids, scalar fields, tensor fields, and spinor fields. Gauge force fields, such
as electromagnetism, are described by n-form fields. Hence, one can define
a general relativistic multiverse to be the class of all models of such n-tuples
{M, g, φ1, ...}, interpreted in this restricted sense.
Alternatively, to take an example suggested by David Wallace (2001), quan-
tum field theory represents a universe to be a Lorentzian manifold (M, g) which
is equipped with a Hilbert space H , a density operator ρ on H , and a collection
of operator-valued distributions {φˆi} onM which take their values as bounded
self-adjoint operators on H . A quantum field theory multiverse is the class of
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all models of such n-tuples {M, g,H , ρ, φˆ1, ... }, interpreted in this restricted
sense.
Assuming that cosmological theories are axiomatizable,2 one can abstract
from the theories which may just apply to our universe or a collection of uni-
verses in a neighbourhood of our own, by varying or relaxing the axioms. Each
set of axioms has its own class of models, which, in this context, provides a mul-
tiverse. Hence, by varying or relaxing the axioms of a theory which is empirically
verified in our universe, one generates a tree-like hierarchy of multiverses, some
of which are sibling to the original class of models, and some of which are parents
or ‘ancestors’ to the original class.
If an empirically verified theory, with a class of models M, and a set of
laws L, defines a subclass of models ML, and if those laws contain a set of free
parameters {pi : i = 1, ..., n}, then one has a different class of models ML(pi) for
each set of combined values of the parameters {pi}. These multiverses are sibling
to each other in the hierarchy. By relaxing the requirement that any set of laws
be satisfied in the mathematical structure in question, one obtains a multiverse
M which is parent to all the multiverses ML(pi). By varying the axioms that
define the original mathematical structure, one obtains sibling mathematical
structures which have classes of model {Nj} sibling to M. By relaxing the
axioms that define the original mathematical structure, one steadily obtains
more general mathematical structures which have more general classes of model
Pk ⊃ M. Each such Pk is a parent or ancestor in the hierarchy to all the
multiverses {Nj}. For example, if we take general relativistic cosmology to
provide a theory of our own universe, one can obtain a selective hierarchy of
multiverses such as the following:
• All Friedmann-Robertson-Walker (FRW) spatially isotropic Lorentzian 4-
manifolds and matter field pairings.
• All Bianchi spatially homogeneous Lorentzian 4-manifolds and matter field
pairings.
• All Lorentzian 4-manifolds which solve the canonical/initial-value formu-
lation of the Einstein field equations with respect to some combination of
matter fields and gauge fields,3 for a fixed spatial topology Σ.
• All Lorentzian 4-manifolds which satisfy the Einstein field equations with
respect to some combination of matter fields and gauge fields, for the value
of the gravitational constant G ≈ 6.67× 10−8cm3g−1s−2 that we observe
in our universe.
• All Lorentzian 4-manifolds which satisfy the Einstein field equations with
respect to some combination of matter fields and gauge fields, for a differ-
ent value of the gravitational constant G.
2i.e assuming that there is a decidable set of sentences (Enderton p62) in such a theory,
from which all the sentences of the theory are logically implied.
3Note that matter fields and gauge force fields must satisfy their own constraint equations
and evolution equations.
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• All Lorentzian 4-manifolds equipped with some combination of matter
fields and gauge fields, irrespective of whether they satisfy the Einstein
field equations.
• All Lorentzian 4-manifolds.
• All manifolds of arbitrary dimension and geometrical signature, which
satisfy the Einstein field equations with respect to some combination of
matter fields and gauge fields.
• All 4-manifolds equipped with combinations of smooth tensor and spinor
fields4 which satisfy differential equations.
• All 4-manifolds.
• All differential manifolds of any dimension equipped with combinations of
smooth tensor and spinor fields which satisfy differential equations.
• All differential manifolds.
• All topological manifolds equipped with combinations of continuous func-
tions which satisfy algebraic5 equations.
• All topological spaces with the cardinality of the continuum equipped with
combinations of continuous functions which satisfy algebraic equations.
• All topological spaces of any cardinality equipped with combinations of
continuous functions which satisfy algebraic equations.
• All topological spaces.
• All sets equipped with combinations of functions which satisfy algebraic
equations.
• All sets.
• All categories.
Mosterin comments acerbically that “authors fond of many universes talk
about them in a variety of incompatible ways. The totality of the many universes
accepted by an author forms the multiverse for that author. There are at least
as many multiverses as authors talking about them; in fact, there are more, as
some authors have several multiverses to offer,” (2004). Bearing this in mind,
it should be declared that this paper is only interested in multiverses consisting
of the models of empirically verified theories, or generalisations obtained from
4Note that global spinor fields require a manifold to possess a spin structure.
5Algebraic equations involve only the operations defined upon the algebra of functions A .
This means operations such as scalar multiplication, sum, product, and derivation. In this
context, a derivation of A is a mapping X : A → A which is linear, X(af+bg) = aXf+bXg,
and which satisfies the so-called Leibniz rule, X(fg) = fX(g) +X(f)g.
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such theories. Hence, multiverses derived from supersymmetry, supergravity,
superstring or M theory, will not be considered.
From the list of multiverses above, we now proceed to consider a couple
of interesting cases. In particular, we will be interested in understanding how
special or typical our own universe is with respect to these multiverses.
2 The multiverse of spatially homogeneous
models
The purpose of this section is to analyse an argument by Collins and Hawking
that our own spatially isotropic universe is extremely atypical even in the space
of spatially homogeneous models. To gain some understanding of the argument,
however, we need to begin with some facts about spatially homogeneous models.
It is generally believed that, up to local isometry, a spatially homogeneous
model, equipped with a fluid satisfying a specific equation of state, can be
uniquely identified by specifying both its Bianchi type, and by specifying its
dynamical history. The Bianchi type classifies the 3-dimensional Lie algebra
of Killing vector fields on the spatially homogeneous hypersurfaces of such a
model.
In any 3-dimensional Lie algebra, the space of all possible bases is 9-
dimensional, and the general linear group GL(3,R) acts simply transitively
upon this space of bases. Hence, if one fixes a basis, then one can establish
a one-to-one mapping between the bases in the Lie algebra and the matrices in
GL(3,R). Needless to say, GL(3,R) is a 9-dimensional group. Now, specifying
the structure constants of a 3-dimensional Lie algebra relative to a particular
basis uniquely identifies a particular Bianchi type. Given a Bianchi type fixed
in such a manner, one can allow GL(3,R) to act upon the space of bases in the
Lie algebra. Under some changes of basis, the structure constants will change,
whilst under other changes of basis, they will remain unchanged. Hence, the
action of GL(3,R) upon the space of structure constants for a particular Bianchi
type is multiply transitive; the action of GL(3,R) upon the space of structure
constants has a non-trivial stability subgroup. The dimension of this stability
subgroup depends upon the Bianchi type.
Another way of looking at this is to consider the 6-dimensional space of all
possible structure constants for all possible 3-dimensional Lie algebras. The
general linear group GL(3,R) acts upon this space. The GL(3,R)-action does
not map the structure constants of one Bianchi type into another; changing the
basis in a Lie algebra will not give you the structure constants of a different Lie
algebra. Hence, each orbit of GL(3,R) in the space of all structure constants
corresponds to a particular Bianchi type. The dimension p of each orbit is given
in the table below, (Collins and Hawking 1973, p321; Hewitt et al 1997, p210;
MacCallum 1979, p541). The dimension of the GL(3,R)-orbit for each Bianchi
type equals the number of free parameters required to specify the structure
constants for that Bianchi type. Given that GL(3,R) is a 9-dimensional group,
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it follows that its stability group at each point in the space of structure constants
will be 9 − p dimensional. This is the dimension of the space of bases under
which the structure constants are unchanged.
Table 1: Dimension of the GL(3,R)-orbits for each Bianchi type.
Type Dimension
I 0
II 3
VI0 5
VII0 5
VIII 6
IX 6
V 3
IV 5
VIh 6
VIIh 6
Collins and Hawking (1973) argued that the set of spatially homogeneous
but anisotropic models which tend towards isotropy as t→∞ is of measure zero
in the set of all spatially homogeneous initial data. They first excluded all the
Bianchi types whose metrics are of measure zero in the space of all 3-dimensional
homogeneous metrics. This includes all the Bianchi types whoseGL(3,R)-orbits
are of dimension less than 6. They then excluded types VIh and VIII on the
grounds that they do not contain any FRW models as limiting cases. How-
ever, the class of Bianchi type VIIh models contain the ever-expanding FRW
universes, with spatial curvature k < 0, as special cases, and the class of type
IX models contain the closed k > 1 FRW universes. In the class of type VIIh
models, where σij is the shear tensor and H is a generalized Hubble parameter,
approach to isotropy was defined to mean that the ‘distortion’ σ/H → 0 as
t → ∞, and that the cumulative distortion
∫ t
σ dt approaches a constant as
t → ∞, where σ = σii. Collins and Hawking concluded that there is no open
neighbourhood of the FRW models in the space of either type VIIh or type IX
metrics which tends towards isotropy. However, they did find that in the space
of type VII0 metrics, which contains the k = 0 FRW universes as special cases,
and with the matter assumed to be zero-pressure ‘dust’, there is an open neigh-
bourhood about such FRW universes which do approach isotropy. However, the
space of type VII0 metrics is of measure zero in the space of all homogeneous
metrics. Moreover, the assumption of a zero-pressure matter field prevents one
applying this result to universes which have a radiated-dominated phase, such
as our own is believed to have undergone in its early history.
From their conclusion that the set of spatially homogeneous models which
approach isotropy as t → ∞ is of measure zero, Collins and Hawking also
inferred that isotropic models are unstable under spatially homogeneous per-
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turbations. In other words, it was argued that a model which is initially almost
isotropic and spatially homogeneous, will tend towards anisotropy. However,
Barrow and Tipler correctly point out that the requirement σ/H → 0 is the
condition of ‘asymptotic stability’, and the open FRW universe in the type
VIIh Bianchi class is stable under spatially homogeneous perturbations in the
sense that σ/H approaches a constant. According to Barrow and Tipler this
shows “that isotropic open universes are stable in the same sense that our solar
system is stable. As t → ∞ there exist spatially homogeneous perturbations
with σ/H → constant but there are none with σ/H → ∞. The demand for
asymptotic stability is too strong a requirement,” (1986, p425). Whilst the set of
spatially homogeneous models which approach isotropy is of measure zero, our
own universe is not exactly isotropic, it is merely ‘almost-isotropic’, and, more-
over, it is growing increasingly anisotropic as a function of time. Collins and
Hawking fail to demonstrate that almost-isotropic spatially homogeneous mod-
els are of measure zero in the space of spatially homogeneous models. Moreover,
our own universe is almost a FRW model in the sense that it has approximate
spatial homogeneity and approximate spatial isotropy. Our own universe, then,
has been perturbed by inhomogeneous perturbations. Collins and Hawking fail
to demonstrate that almost-isotropic and almost-homogeneous universes, like
our own, are of measure zero in the space of almost homogeneous models.
To derive their conclusion that type VIIh models fail to isotropize, Collins
and Hawking assumed various reasonable conditions defining the nature of mat-
ter, but they also assumed a zero cosmological constant, an assumption which
recent astronomical evidence for an accelerating universe has cast into seri-
ous doubt. Wald (1983) demonstrated that all initially expanding non-type IX
Bianchi models with spatial curvature k ≤ 0 and a positive cosmological con-
stant, do in fact isotropize, expanding exponentially, and tending toward de
Sitter space-time, with σ/H → 0 as t → ∞. However, Wald’s result only ap-
plies to Bianchi type IX models if one assumes that the cosmological constant
is initially large in comparison with the scalar curvature of the hypersurfaces of
homogeneity, (Earman and Mosterin, 1999). In addition, Wald’s result has not
been extended to spatially inhomogeneous universes. The attempt by Jensen
and Stein-Schabes (1987) to extend Wald’s result makes the physically unac-
ceptable assumption that the scalar curvature is non-positive throughout the
space-time. Even with initial non-positive scalar curvature, in a spatially in-
homogeneous universe one would expect pockets of positive curvature to form
with the passage of time, such as those around black holes, stars and planets.
The exterior Schwarzschild solution, generalized to the case of a positive cos-
mological constant, has such positive curvature, and doesn’t evolve towards de
Sitter space-time, (Earman and Mosterin 1999). It remains an open question
whether initially expanding, spatially inhomogeneous universes of initial non-
positive curvature, which develop localized pockets of positive curvature, evolve
towards de Sitter space-time if they have a positive cosmological constant.
It is true, however, that the finite-dimensional space of exact FRW models is
of measure zero in the finite-dimensional space of spatially homogeneous models,
and Collins and Hawking demonstrate that spatially homogeneous anisotropic
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models do not generally approach isotropic ones, unless the cosmological con-
stant is non-zero. As we will see, the space of spatially homogeneous models is
itself the complement of an open dense subset in the infinite-dimensional space
of all solutions to the Einstein field equations. Hence, the space of exact FRW
models is as numerous in the space of spatially homogeneous models as the inte-
gers are in the set of real numbers, and the set of spatially homogeneous models
is as prevalent in the space of all solutions to the Einstein field equations as the
points in the surface of solid ball are to the points in the interior of the solid
ball.
3 The multiverse of all solutions to the Einstein
field equations
For each 4-dimensional manifold M, one has the space of all solutions to the
Einstein field equations on that manifold, E (M). Rather than dealing with
matter field solutions, existing analysis has concentrated on vacuum solutions of
the Einstein field equations, and yet further restrictions have been placed on the
topology and geometry of the solutions considered. For example, work has been
done on the space E˜ (M) of vacuum solutions of a globally hyperbolic space-time
with compact spatial topology Σ, containing a constant mean extrinsic curvature
Cauchy hypersurface. The restrictions placed upon such solution spaces means
that they really just contain the solutions of initial data sets. Nothing is revealed
about spaces of solutions which do not admit an initial-value formulation.
E˜ (M) is not a manifold, but a stratified space. The points representing solu-
tions with a non-trivial isometry group are said to have conical neighbourhoods.
The strata consist of space-times with conjugate isometry groups, (Isenberg and
Marsden 1982, p187).
Two space-time solutions are considered to be physically equivalent if one
is isometric to the other, hence work has been done on the quotient space
E˜ (M)/D(M) with respect to the diffeomorphism group D(M) of the 4-
manifold. Again, E˜ (M)/D(M) is not a manifold itself, but a stratified space.
The points in E˜ (M)/D(M) with no isometry group form an open and dense sub-
set. In other words, the stratum of equivalence classes of solutions to Einstein’s
equations with no isometries, is open and dense in E˜ (M)/D(M), (Isenberg
and Marsden, p210). This is thought to confirm the general presumption that
space-times with no symmetry are extremely typical in the set of space-times,
and space-times with some degree of symmetry are extremely special.6 The
Friedmann-Robertson-Walker models, and perturbations thereof, considered to
be the physically realistic models for our universe, are believed to be extremely
atypical in the space of all solutions to the Einstein field equations. As Turner
comments, “even the class of slightly lumpy FRW solutions occupies only a set
of measure zero in the space of initial data,” (Turner 2001, p655).
This, however, might be a somewhat hasty conclusion to reach. As Ellis
6In this context, the term ‘special’ will be considered equivalent to the term ‘atypical’.
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comments: “We have at present no fully satisfactory measure of the distance
between two cosmological models...or of the probability of any particular model
occurring in the space of all cosmologies. Without such a solid base, intuitive
measures are often used...the results obtained are dependent on the variables
chosen, and could be misleading-one can change them by changing the variables
used or the associated assumptions. So if one wishes to talk about the prob-
ability of the universe or of specific cosmological models, as physicists wish to
do, the proper foundation for those concepts is not yet in place,” (1999).
When a collection of objects forms a finite-dimensional manifold, and in the
absence of any sort of probability measure, one uses the Lebesgue measure, or
an analogue thereof, to define precisely what it means for a property to be typ-
ical or special. If the manifold provides a finite measure space, then a property
which is only possessed by a subset of measure zero is considered to be spe-
cial, while if the manifold provides an infinite measure space, then a property
which is only possessed by a subset of finite measure is considered to be special.
In both cases, the property which defines the complement is considered to be
typical of the collection of objects. In the case of an infinite-dimensional topo-
logical vector space, there is no finite, translation invariant measure to provide
an analogue of the Lebesgue measure, and although non-translation invariant
Gaussian measures do exist on such infinite-dimensional vector spaces, in the
case of an infinite-dimensional manifold there is no diffeomorphism-invariant
measure which is considered to be suitable. As Callender comments, “debates
about likely versus unlikely initial conditions without a well-defined probability
are just intuition-mongering,” (2004). Given the difficulties with finding such
a measure, topological notions of typical and special have been proposed to
replace the measure-theoretic notions.
The first candidate for a topological notion of typicality is the notion of
a dense subset. However, the set of rational numbers is dense in the set of
real numbers, despite having a lower cardinality, and despite being of Lebesgue
measure zero, hence a dense subset of a topological space is not necessarily con-
sidered to be typical. Instead, following Baire, an open and dense subset of a
topological space is ‘strongly typical’, and a set which contains the intersection
of a countable collection of dense and open subsets is ‘residual’, or ‘typical’
(Heller 1992, p72). The irrational numbers are a residual subset of the reals,
and therefore typical, and their complement, the rational numbers, are atypi-
cal. Baire’s theorem shows that in a complete metric space or a locally compact
Hausdorff space, a countable intersection of open dense subsets must itself be
dense. However, the attraction of the Baire definition of typicality is mitigated
by the fact that sets which are open and dense in Rn can have arbitrarily small
Lebesgue measure, (Hunt et al 1992). Moreover, an infinite-dimensional mani-
fold fails to be locally compact. It is therefore far from clear that a collection
of universes which is open and dense in a multiverse collection, should be con-
sidered as typical, or that points which belong to the complement, (those with
some degree of symmetry), should be considered special. There is no a priori
notion of typicality on such sets, so it is rather unwise to make such presump-
tions. In the classical statistical mechanics of gases, it is always asserted that
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a homogeneous distribution of the gas is the macrostate of highest entropy be-
cause it has the greatest volume of microstates, the greatest volume of phase
space, associated with it. This means that the homogeneous macrostates must
have the highest measure, and certainly not measure zero. Thus, there is cer-
tainly no a priori reason from the finite-dimensional case to think that in the
case of continuous fields, a highly symmetrical configuration should be atypical.
Note that the present universe only approximates a FRW model on length
scales greater than 100Mpc. On smaller length scales, the universe exhibits
large inhomogeneities and anisotropies. The distribution of matter is charac-
terised by walls, filaments and voids up to 100Mpc, with large peculiar velocities
relative to the rest frame defined by the cosmic microwave background radia-
tion (CMBR). Whilst the CMBR indicates that the matter in the universe was
spatially isotropic and homogeneous to a high degree when the universe was
104 − 105yrs old, the distribution and motion of galaxies is an indicator of the
distribution of matter in the present era, when the universe is ∼ 1010 yrs old.
Due to the tendency of gravitation to amplify small initial inhomogeneities,
the level of inhomogeneity in the distribution of matter has been growing as a
function of time.
In contrast with the behaviour of a gas in classical statistical mechanics,
the distribution of matter in a gravitational system will become more ‘clumpy’
as a function of time. Hence, to preserve consistency with the second law of
thermodynamics it is generally suggested that for a gravitational system, such
clumpy configurations correspond to higher-entropy macrostates than configu-
rations with a uniform distribution of matter. Barrow and Tipler, for example,
suggest that a gravitational entropy would measure the deviation of a universe
from exact spatial isotropy and homogeneity (1986, p446). Penrose suggests
that gravitational entropy is related to the Weyl tensor Cαβγδ, which is zero for
exact FRW models, but non-zero for the space-time around a massive body such
as a star or black hole. However, anisotropy does not entail a non-zero Weyl
tensor, and a non-zero Weyl tensor does not entail inhomogeneity. Barrow and
Tipler note that ‘many’ space-times tend towards a plane gravitational wave
geometry, which has a zero Weyl tensor irrespective of the level of anisotropy
(1986, p447). On the other hand, there are many anisotropic but spatially
homogeneous models, in which the Weyl tensor is non-zero. Thus, if we ac-
cept that the Weyl tensor measures gravitational entropy, then even a universe
which is exactly spatially homogeneous, will, if it exhibits anisotropic shears
and a non-zero Weyl tensor, possess a higher entropy than a perfectly isotropic
and homogeneous FRW universe.
Ellis (2002) suggests that the spatial divergence of the electric part of the
Weyl tensor Eαγ = CαβγδU
βU δ, for a timelike observer vector field U , may be
a measure of gravitational entropy. This quantity is attractive because it does
seem to have some correlation to the level of spatial inhomogeneity. One could
take the integral
∫
Σ
||∇aρ|| dµ of the spacelike gradient of the matter density
field ρ as a measure of the amount of inhomogeneity in the matter field over
a spacelike hypersurface Σ. In the case of a homogeneous matter field, this
integral vanishes. Ellis suggests that in the linearized formulation of general
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relativity,
∇aEab =
1
3
∇bρ ,
hence the integral
∫
Σ ||∇
aEab|| dµ may, in some circumstances, be proportional
to the level of inhomogeneity, and thence a good indicator of gravitational en-
tropy. Suppose that one takes the integral of ∇aEab for an arbitrary spatially
homogeneous but anisotropic model. Being spatially homogeneous, the spatial
gradient of ρ vanishes. If one introduces an inhomogeneous perturbation to
this model, then the integral of ∇aEab should presumably increase. The inho-
mogeneity of our own universe is currently growing, and, if the inhomogeneous
geometries are far more prevalent, in some sense, than homogeneous geometries,
then our universe must be moving into phase space macrostates of much greater
entropy.
There is, however, a problem with the notion that gravitational entropy
should measure the deviation of a universe from exact isotropy and homogeneity.
If there is a positive cosmological constant, and if Wald’s theorem does apply
to the case of an inhomogeneous universe, then the universe will isotropize, and
isotropy requires homogeneity. Even in the absence of a cosmological constant,
all gravitational systems, perhaps even black holes, will eventually ‘evaporate’,
and this might also entail a return to homogeneity. Thus, if the universe tends
towards either isotropy or homogeneity in the long-term, perhaps gravitational
entropy should not measure the deviation of a universe from exact isotropy and
homogeneity.
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